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NOTES AND COMMENT
upon its discovery.24 But as was said in Weill v. Weill,23 "The rule
now seems to be that if the fraud be such that had it not been prac-
ticed the contract would not have been made, or the transaction of
marriage completed, then it is material (error substantialis) ; but if it
be shown or made probable that the same thing would have been done
by the same parties in the same way if the fraud had not been prac-
ticed, it cannot be deemed material (error accidentalis)." The ma-
teriality of the fraud practiced should not only determine whether the
defrauded party is entitled to relief, but from the Weill case, supra,
it should be asked would the marriage have taken place had the fraud
not been practiced. If the answer is in the negative then the plaintiff
is entitled to relief.
L. L. W.
LIABILITY OF DOMINANT CORPORATION FOR Acts OF SUBSIDIARY.
The advantages of conducting a business in the corporate style
are probably legion, and the limited liability obtained through the use
of this "form" is undoubtedly one of the chief inducements to persons
to adopt this method. In this connection, the question of liability of
the parent corporation for acts of its subsidiary is worthy of con-
sideration and the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Berkey
v. Third Avenue R. Co.' presents excellent material for a dis-
cussion of this interesting proposition.
Plaintiff, alighting from a street car, sustained injuries by reason
of the motorman's negligence. The franchise to operate cars over
the route used by plaintiff was owned exclusively by the Forty-second
Street, Manhattanville and St. Nicholas Railway Co., but the car upon
which plaintiff was riding bore the inscription "Third Ave. System,"
was owned by it and leased to the Forty-second Street Co. It was
against the Third Ave. System that plaintiff prosecuted her action.
She sought to charge it with liability by the establishment at the trial
of facts showing that substantially all the stock of the Forty-second
Street Co. was owned by it; that the same persons were officers of
both companies and that the two boards of directors were almost
identical in membership.
Plaintiff's argument was that defendant controlled the operations
of the Forty-second Street Co. and was the real owner thereof dis-
"'"The aggrieved party must act promptly upon discovery or the
relief will not be afforded. In this respect at least the parties are bound
by the same rules governing the rescission of contracts in equity, and the
greatest diligence is required of plaintiff." Butler v. Butler, supra, note 22,
Wallich v. Wallich, N. Y. L. J., June 12, 1925.
' 104 Misc. 561, 562, 172 N. Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct.. 1918)
'244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926)
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guising such ownership by use of the "corporate veil" 2 in the hope
that it would prove an effective barrier to claims for damages.
Defendant contended that ownership of a controlling interest in
the stock of the Forty-second Street Co. did not make it liable for the
operations of that Company3 and succeeded in having the complaint
dismissed, but the Appellate Division, holding that there was a ques-
tion for the jury, ordered a new trial, from which order defendant
appealed. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed.
The judges of the Court of Appeals were not unanimous in their
decision for defendant, Judge Crane writing a dissenting opinion in
which Judge Pound concurred. The prevailing opinion written by
Judge Cardozo states that the Court is unable to satisfy itself that
the alleged dominion was exerted. It points out that the books of
account, records, etc., were at all times maintained separate and dis-
tinct from those of the parent corporation. The law "does not pro-
hibit stock ownership, or at least did not so far as the record shows,
when the defendant bought the shares." '4 But to sustain plaintiff's
theory it would be necessary for the Court to presume the existence
of a contract between the two corporations. Such a contract, if
made, would be illegal unless approved by the Public Service Com-
mission.5 Therefore, says the Court:
"We cannot believe that an agreement criminal in concep-
tion * * * may be inferred from conduct or circumstances so
indefinite and equivocal." G
'Plaintiff sought to come within the rules laid down in:
Anthony v. American Glucose Co., 146 N. Y. 407, 41 N. E. 23 (1895);
C. M. & St. P. v. Minn., 247 U. S. 490 (1918); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Brooklyn Bottle Co., 190 Fed. 323 (E. D. N. Y., 1911); Davis v. Alexan-
der, 269 U. S. 114 (1926); Foard Co. v. State, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1906) ; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1904); Luckenbach v. Grace, 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920); Otway v.
Snare & Triest Co., 167 App. Div. 128, 152 N. Y. Supp. 845 (2nd Dept.,
1915); Summo v. Snare & Triest Co., 166 App. Div. 425, 152 N. Y. Supp.
29 (2nd Dept., 1915); The Willem Van Duel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A.
4th, 1918); Wilkinson v. Walker, 294 Fed. 939 (N. D. Texas, 1923).
'Defendant's case found support in:
Demarest v. Flack, 128 N. Y. 205, 28 N. E. 645 (1891); Doran v.
N. Y. I. Co., 239 N. Y. 448, 147 N. E. 62 (1925); Elenkueg v. Sibrecht,
238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924); Matter of Vannia v. Anti-Saloon,
238 N. Y. 457, 144 N. E. 679 (1924); Stone v. C. C. & St. L., 202 N. Y.
352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911).
'Supra, note 1, at 91.
'N. Y. Publ. Serv. Comm. L., § 54.
'Supra, note 4.
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Plaintiff, though citing several New York cases,7 relies principally
upon Federal authorities,S chief of which is Davis v. Alexander, et al,"
holding that where one railroad controlled another, and operated
both as a single system, and the Director General, after taking them
over, pursued the same practice, damages to freight occurring on the
subsidiary line, are recoverable against the Federal Agent, as in
charge of the dominant carrier.
Of the New York cases, Summo v. Snare & Triest Co.' 0 probably
furnishes the best support to plaintiff's argument. Plaintiff, while
in the employ of The Steel and Masonry Contracting Co., was injured
during the course of his employment. He contended that the Steel
and Masonry Contracting Co. was a mere "dummy" organized and
controlled by defendant, Snare & Triest Co., to perform a definite part
of its 'vork. It was held that the question whether or not the
"Snare & Triest Company was the real principal and the Steel &
Masonry Company but an * instrument," was properly submitted
to the jury.":
Should the parent corporation be held liable for the acts of the
subordinate? There is an abundance of authorities both ways.
As to contractual matters, though they are properly within the
scope and purview of this article, the writer purposes to content
himself with a reference to the divergence of opinion12 and confine
his writing to the treatment of negligence as pertinent to the
subject case.
There are numerous cases wherein the dominant corporation was
held responsible for its subsidiary's negligence"3 and just as many to
the contrary.' 4 However, in the former class of cases, judgment was
invariably predicated upon grounds other than those presented in this
instance; fraud, agency or an illegal contract entered into the deter-
mination of the rights of the litigants. Satisfactory proof of the
"New York cases cited in note 2, supra.
' Federal cases cited in note 2, supra.
'Supra, note 2.
'
0 Supra, note 2.
" Ibid. 429.
'Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporation
(1926) 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12, 15; (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1011, 1012.
"Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cities Service Co., 281 Fed. 214 (C. C.
A. 2nd, 1922); United Laundries Co. v. Bradford, 133 Md. 363, 150 Atl.
303; Supra, note 12, 14 Calif. L. Rev. at p. 15, and cases therein cited.
"Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., 251 Fed. 634, 661 (Del.,
1918); Stone v. Cleveland, supra, note 3; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond
Concrete, 141 Md. 67, 118 Atl. 279 (1922); and cases cited in note 3,
supra.
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existence of any one of these would undoubtedly be sufficient to in-
fluence the Court to decide without hesitation in plaintiff's favor.
But here the plaintiff proceeded solely upon the theory of control.
She did not attempt to show fraud or agency, nor raise the question
of illegality, though the court considered this last point in its opinion.
It seems quite certain that stock ownership alone is insufficient nor
does the added feature of identity in officers and directors change the
situation. "The mere fact that the parent corporation owns all the
stock of the subordinate corporation * * * does not make them the
same in law. There must be something in addition to mere unity
of interest and ownership." 15
In Thompson's work on Corporations, Third Edition, the author
after stating the general rule (Section 5485) proceeds:
" * * * and hence a railroad company which is lawfully a
stockholder only in a connecting railroad is not liable for the
negligence of the connecting railroad." 16
So also in Fletcher's Cyc. Corporations, at Section 3988.
"Ownership of a majority of the shares of a corporation by
another company does not affect the separate existence of the two
companies * * * and each will be presumed to be managed in its
own interest." 17
The opinion of the Court of Appeals clearly indicates that despite
the element of control obtained through stock ownership, the Courts
of this State will not fasten liabity upon the parent corporation so
long as the separate existence of the two companies is not clouded by
a merger of funds and the interchanging of employees and equipment
of the respective lines. There may exist a desire for mutual benefit
and welfare by reason of their close relationship, and this may be
evidenced by a very high degree of co-operation which, however, does
not amount to the control of one by the other, nor subject one to
liability for acts of the other. J. A. M.
'Supra, note 12, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12, 17. In an action to oust de-
fendants from charter on ground that one corporation had acquired stock
and was conducting the business for which others were incorporated,
held that stock ownership enables corporation to influence the policy of
other corporation, but that is not taking management of business into its
own hands, State v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 237 Mo. 338, 141 S. W. 643
(1911).
"Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cochran, 43 Kansas 225, 23 Pac.
151 (1890), a corporation which controlled and operated a business
through another corporation is liable for injuries caused by the latter.
"Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 115 U. S. 587,
29 L. Ed. 499 (1885); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Bolling, 66 Ark. 646, 48
S. NV. 806 (1898); Bigelow v. Calumet & H. Nim. Co., 167 Fed. 721
(C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1909). See also Fletcher's Cyc. Corporations § 1133.
